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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is con^arred upon this court by §78-2-2(i),
U.C.A.
This appeal is from final judgment of the District
Court of the Second Judicial District of Weber County, State
of Utah.
The judgment and order to be reviewed on this
appeal are the Judgment entered May 18, 1988, and the Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial entered August 22,
1988. The Notice of Appeal was filed September 19, 1988.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
SHOULD A CALL TO A MONUMENT IN A LEGAL DESCRIPTION TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER A DISTANCE CALL.

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
None.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE G. MAHAS and
LUCILLE H. MAHAS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case Mo. 88-0350

LAVAR RINDLISBACHER,
Defendant-Appellant•

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a suit brought by George G. Mahas and Lucille H.
Mahas against LaVar Rindlisbacher to determine the correct
boundary line separating their respective properties which
are situated in Slaterville, Weber County, State of Utah
Disposition in the Lower Court
The matter was heard in trial before the court and the
court ruled

in favor of Mahases.

motion for a new trial.

Rindlisbacher

filed a

The court denied that motion.

Statement of Facts
LaVar Rindlisbacher and Elaine Rindlisbacher, his wife,
acquired a parcel of real property situated in Slaterville,
Weber County, Utah, from Priscilla M. Owens, aka Pricilla M.
1

Owens, by warranty deed dated July 10, 1975, and recorded
July 15, 1975, as entry number 641926, in book 1092, at page
255

(Exhibit 9).

The legal description contained in the

warranty deed describes the property by metes and bounds and
calls to a known monument (canal).

The legal description is

as follows:
A Part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning 9.06 chains West and South
27° West 22.43 chains from the Northeast corner of
Section 10 (at a point in the Northerly line of the
County Road) thence North 27° East 12.00 chains,
more or less, to a canal; thence Southeasterly
along canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains
from the County Road; thence South 15° West 10.18
chains to the County Road; thence Northwesterly
along the County Road, 600 feet, more or less, to
the place of beginning. Excepting therefrom that
portion Deeded to Marvin L. Barney & wife Edith E.
Barney in Book 1037, Page 2 and Book 1022, Page 70
of Records.
George G. Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, his wife, acquired
a parcel

of real property situated

in Slaterville, Weber

County, Utah, from Joan Norman, formerly known as Joan Mahas,
by warranty deed dated July 8, 1985, and recorded July 8,
1985, as entry number 941574, in book 1474, at page 2513
(contains
property).

the property
The

in dispute

relevant

legal

as well
description

as

additional

appeared

follows:
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
UoS. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to
Warren Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County
Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North

2

as

74• West 198 feet to the point of beginning.
This warranty deed was re-recorded on January 21, 1987,
immediately

prior to the commencement

of this action, as

entry number 996627, in book 1507, at page 2758 (Exhibit 7),
and the relevant legal description therein was altered to
read as follows:
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road;
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74°
West 198 feet to the point of beginning.
The grantor in this warranty deed, Joan Norman, formerly
known as Joan Mahas, acquired a larger tract of real property
from which the subject real property was derived, from Earn
P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, by warranty deed dated March 19,
1970, and recorded April 7, 1970, as entry number 533600, in
book 938, at page 604 (Exhibit 6).

The relevant tract was

therein described as follows:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey, Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast Corner of said Section 10; thence
West 1.06 chains thence South 27° West to Warren
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from county road;
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74°
West 198 feet to point of beginning.
Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer acquired their interest
in the property from Victor J. Wheeler and Mae Wheeler by
warranty deed dated May 19, 1942, and recorded May 19, 1942,
3

in book 160, at page 126 (Exhibit 5). The legal description
of this tract of real property is described as follows:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Surveys Being all that part of the following
described tract of land which lies North of the
canal:
Beginning at a point 20 chains South and
10.25 chains West from the Northeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of said Section 10, running
thence West 9 chains; thence North 27° East 22.45
chains; thence East 1.06 chains; thence South 74°
East 3.85 chains; thence South 7° 45' West 15.84
chains; thence North 58° West 3 chains; thence
South 15° West 5 chains to the place of beginning.
Subsequent to the initiation of this lawsuit, Earn P.
Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, gave a quit claim deed to George C.
Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, this deed being dated May 7,
1987, and recorded May 7, 1987, as entry number 1010147, in
book 1516, at page 1121 (Exhibit 8) .

The legal description

was altered to read as follows:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey, Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence
West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to an old
canal line; thence Southeasterly along said canal
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from county
road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North
74° West 198 feet to a point of beginning.
Mahases commenced

suit against Rindlisbacher under a

complaint dated February 25, 1987, seeking to establish the
boundary
damages

line
for

between

the

Rindlisbacher's

respective

properties

unauthorized

use

and

of

for

Mahas1

property.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The law of boundaries in Utah is settled.
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It is the

purpose of the law to effect the intent of the parties at the
time of the conveyance.
adopted

Rules of construction have been

for the purpose of assisting

giving effect to such intent.

in ascertaining and

The primary rule is that fixed

monuments or markers of a permanent nature which can be
definitely identified and located take precedence over calls
of courses and distance, or plats.
Evidence demonstrates that the relevant deeds contain
calls to a monument which can be none other than the Warren
Canal.

The court erred in speculating that there might have

been another canal, and in relying on the county plat which
erroneously

sets

forth a speculative

representation

of a

canal based upon deed distance calls.

The court further

erred

to claim property

in allowing plaintiff-respondents

which was beyond the calls of their title and that of their
predecessors in title.
That the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
The status of the law of boundaries is well established
in Utah.
The

most

critical

consideration

in

determining

boundaries is to effect the intent of the parties {see 12
AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 64; Achter vs. Maw, 27 Utah 2d
149, 493 P2d 989, 993 (1972); Scott vs. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d
303,

422

P2d

525, 527

(1966)}; and Johnson Real

Estate

Company v. Nielson, 10 Utah 2d 380, 353 P2d 918 (1960).
5

In

construing intent the most reliable rule is to accept a call
to a monument as superior to a distance call.
The rules of construction for determining the intent of
the parties are in relevant part set forth as follows:
1.

If all parts of the description can reasonably be

interpreted to be consistent, the description should be so
interpreted (12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 64).
2.

If all parts of the description are not consistent,

then the order of precedence as between the different calls
is as follows:
(a)
(c)

Natural monuments, (b) artificial monuments,

adjacent

boundaries

and

finally

(d)

courses

and

distances. {See 12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 65; Johnson
Real Estate Company vs. Nielson 10 Utah 2d 380, 353 P2d 918,
920 (Utah 1960); Scott vs. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P2d
525, 257 (Utah 1966); Achter vs. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149, 493 P2d
989, 993 (Utah 1972).
3.

Any call can be disregarded

if it leads to an

absurdity (12 AmJur 2d Boundaries. Sections 66 and 67).
4.

An inconsistent call should be discarded if thereby

all the rest of the calls are reconciled and the description
perfected (12 AmJur 2d Boundaries, Section 66).
5.

As few calls or descriptions as possible should be

disregarded (12 AmJur 2d, Boundaries, Section 66).
Application
determining

of

the

first

rule

of

construction

for

intent requires examination of the deed(s) to
6

determine whether all parts of the description(s) can be
Both the Mahas1 and

reasonably interpreted to be consistent.
Rindlisbacher's
followed

by

descriptions
the

contain

following

a call to the canal

common

course:

...

"thence

Southeasterly along said canal to a point North 15° East
10.18

chains

from

county

road...11.

This

requires

both

descriptions to follow the line of the canal to the same
point.
Without reference to the monument

(physically existing

canal), neither legal description can trace the line of the
canal.

To attempt to place this course anywhere but on the

line of the physically existing canal creates an absurdity,
because there is no legitimate way to bring about closure of
the

description.

vague.

On

"Southeasterly"

the other hand,

standing

reference

alone

is too

to the physically

existing Warren Canal as the existing monument allows the
property boundary to be precisely defined and allows closure
The Mahas1 description is

of Rindlisbacher's description.

self contradictory in that it doubles back on itself on part
of one call, but nevertheless closes.

Thus, application of

this

all

rule

of

construction

allows

parts

of

both

descriptions to be interpreted with consistency and therefore
the Warren Canal should be interpreted to be the boundary.
Mahases claim that the real

intent was to make the

boundary line an "old canal," not the Warren Canal, and that
the monument call to "the old canal" is therefore correct.
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Mahases have laboriously "corrected" their original deeds to
substitute

"canal"

descriptions.

for

"Warren

Canal"

in

their

deed

It is apparent from the original deeds that

Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer perceived their boundary to
be

the

Warren

monument.

Canal,

and

they

conveyed

title

to

that

Likewise, Joan Norman perceived her boundary to be

the Warren Canal and she conveyed title to that monument.
Recognizing that a deed call to the Warren Canal was fatal to
their position, Mahases acquired corrective deeds to change
the stated intent of Fryers and Norman, and thus obfuscate
the location of the canal monument.

They have attempted to

create the illusion there was another canal.

There is no

evidence to support the existence of a second canal parallel
to the Warren

Canal.

The absence of a second canal is

evidenced by the following:
a)

Exhibit 23 which demonstrates the existence of

the Warren Canal as early as 1908, with no reference to a
parallel canal.
b)

The affidavit in the court file from Wesley T.

Spencer, a 50 year resident of the area who states that there
has been but one canal within the area, the Warren Canal, and
that

Rindlisbacher

and

his

predecessors

have

farmed

the

property to the Warren Canal.
c)

Unopposed proffer of testimony at trial that

there were witnesses who would testify that there was only
one canal, the Warren Canal, in the area within the last
8

forty (40) years (p.99).
d)
canal.

None of the deed calls recites more than one

A call to "a canal" or "the canal" implies that there

was only one canal in the area.
description
boundary
Canal.

to

reach

requires

the

their

line

In order for the Mahases
which

description

they

to

claim

cross

as the

the Warren

Reason would argue that if the Warren Canal was in

existence as early as 1908, and a grantor intended to convey
property on both sides of the Warren Canal, that the deed
description would specifically state that the call crosses
the Warren Canal to another canal, instead of simply reciting
"to canal."
Furthermore,

to constitute a monument a landmark

must have certain qualities, such as "visibility, permanence,
stability and a definite location ..." See Achter vs. Maw,
Supra at Page 993.

Therefore, the "old canal," which exists

only as a line on the plat map, is still insufficient to
describe the property, leaving plaintiffs with an invalid
description.

In Scott vs. Hansen, Supra at Page 527 there

appears the following language:
"...it becomes important to determine if possible
the intent of the parties at the time of
conveyance. There are rules of construction which
have been adopted for the purpose of assisting in
ascertaining and giving effect to such intent. One
of these is that fixed monuments or markers of a
permanent nature which can be definitely identified
and located take precedence over calls of courses
or distances, or plats, or amounts of acreage.
(Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that this entire dispute has arisen by
9

virtue of the manner in which the Weber County Recorder has
designated the Rindlisbacher's and Mahas1 legal descriptions
on the county plats.
speculate

on

the

(See Exhibit 2).

possible

existence

Mahases continue to
of an

old

canal

to

justify the validity of their interpretation of their legal
description because of what is shown on the county plats,
notwithstanding
speculation.
court.)

there

is

no

evidence

to

support

this

(See Amended Findings 5 and 6 of the trial

The plats maintained by the County Recorder are a

means of identifying property ownership.
two-dimensional

The plats are a

representation of ownership and boundaries

which rely upon the accuracy of surveyors and draftsman,
without

reference

to apparent

imperfections

(such as the

earthfs curvature resulting in Sections that are sometimes
larger and sometimes smaller than the ideal norm).
further

handicapped

in

accurately

describing

Plats are
properties

because they do not reveal natural or artificial monuments.
Herein lies the problem with monuments in legal descriptions;
the law affords priority to monuments in land descriptions,
while the draftsman who creates the county plats has no way
of accurately depicting those monuments on his plats, indeed,
the

monuments

Therefore,

do

not

he

plats

when

normally
a

legal

appear

on

description

the

plats.

containing

courses, distances and monuments, he is able to plat only
those portions which he
namely distances.

is able to plat with

certainty,

When presented with descriptions such as

10

those of the Mahases and Rindlisbacher, he can plat a course
with a distance, and then can only speculate as to whether
the description at that point intersects a monument (canal)
which does not appear on his plat.

Based on his lack of

certainty, he draws in an imaginary line to represent the
monument

(canal).

draftsman's

Others

speculation

and

then

place

create

reliance

other

upon

descriptions

the
in

reliance thereon, resulting in speculation becoming the basis
in fact for other incorrect legal descriptions.

Note that

all of the testimony in the trial court dealt with a county
plat which on its face acknowledges that the location of the
warren canal shown on that plat is an approximation based
upon an aerial survey.
survey.

It is not platted therein by a land

Further note that the deed descriptions of Mahas1

predecessors in title were for property north of the canal.
Notwithstanding the Rindlisbacher deed precedes the Mahas1
deed, and the call of the Mahas1 deed is "south 27° West to
Warren Canal" or ("an old canal", as re-recorded), the county
recorder platted the Mahas1
Canal

to

"canal".

the

imaginary

description across the Warren

line

on

the

plat

designated

as

It is submitted that this was a result of platting

the Rindlisbacher deed to a distance (12 chains) instead of
to the monument, and then platting Mahas1 description to this
point to close and to prevent gaps.
If, for the sake of argument, Rindlisbacher concedes
that

all

parts

of

his

description
11

cannot

reasonably

be

interpreted to be consistent, then an interpretation should
be

sought

under

the

determining intent.

second

rule

of

construction

for

If all parts of the description are not

consistent, then the order of precedence between the calls
would be first to natural monuments (in this case the canal),
and lastly to courses and distances, which are the basis for
Mahas1 attempt to discredit Rindlisbacher1s description.

As

argued elsewhere herein, there is copious evidence that the
Warren Canal is the only canal ever existing in the area and
is the monument

to which attention must be turned

if a

correct application of the law is to be made in this matter.
The third rule of construction for determining intent
allows a call to be disregarded if it leads to an absurdity.
Rindlisbacher*s call to the canal is consistent with Mahas'
call to the canal.

To follow Rindlisbacher's description

from the canal

southeasterly

around the perimeter of his

description

logical

consistent,

closure.

is
It

is

also

and

consistent

with

Rindlisbacher's predecessors in title.

and
the

results

in

ownership

of

Likewise, Mahas1 call

to the canal is consistent with Rindlisbacher's call to the
canal.

To follow Mahas' description southeasterly along the

canal is consistent with Rindlisbacher's description and is
also consistent with the ownership of Mahas' predecessors in
title.

The only absurdity in either description occurs when

Mahas'

call

instead

of

retraces
making

a

itself

northward

along

call

eastward

before

12

the

canal,

proceeding

northward.

This absurdity was created by Mahas1 predecessor

in title, not by Rindlisbacher.

It is erroneous to attempt

to harmonize Mahas1 description by making the unwarranted
assumption that another canal may have existed in a location
justifying that harmony when there is no evidence to support

If

Rindlisbacher1s

call

to

the

canal

is

considered

inconsistent and thereby discarded, as argued by Mahases in
application of the fourth rule of construction, Mahases are
left with their own inconsistent call as stated above, as
well

as the

fact that their root of title places their

description north of the canal.
Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 1 demonstrates that the chain of

title, by which Mahases derive title, vested ownership to
lands lying North of the canal.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 is a warranty deed dated May 19,
1942, wherein Victor J. Wheeler and Mae Wheeler convey to
Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer, the following:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: being all that part of the following
described tract of land which lies North of the
canal:
Beginning at a point 20 chains South 10.25
chains West from the Northeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of said Section 10, running
thence West 9 chains; thence North 27° East 22.45
chains; thence East 1.06 chains; thence South 74°
East 3.85 chains; thence South 7°45' West 15.84
chains; thence North 58° West 3 chains; thence
South 15° West 5 chains to the place of beginning.
(Emphasis added)
(Note: This description contains plaintiffs1
description, together with additional property).
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Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 is a warranty deed dated March 19,
1970, wherein Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer convey to Jimmy
G. Mahas and Joan Mahas, the following:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U,S. Survey, beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence
West 1.06 chains thence South 27° West to Warren
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said canal to a
point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road;
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74°
West 198 feet to point of beginning, (emphasis
added•)
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 8 is a quit claim deed dated May 7,
1987 (recorded by Mahas1 counsel subsequent to the filing of
this lawsuit) wherein Earn P. Fryer and Ella B. Fryer convey
to George G. Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas, the following:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey, beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; thence
West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to an old
canal line; thence Southeasterly along said canal
to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from County
Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North
74° West 198 feet to point of beginning, (emphasis
added•)
In the body of the above deed appears the following
language: "This deed is given to correct a deed heretofore
given by us dated the 19th day of March, 1970 and recorded
April 7, 1970 in the office of the Weber County Recorder as
number 533600, which said deed mistakenly referred to the
"Warren Canal" as one of the boundaries."

(It is to be noted

that this quit claim deed names the Mahases as Grantees, yet
purports to correct the earlier deed wherein Jimmy G. Mahas
14

and Joan Mahas were named as Grantees).
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7 is a warranty deed wherein Joan
Norman, formerly known as Joan Mahas, conveys to George G.
Mahas and Lucille H. Mahas the legal description by which
they now claim title.
stamps.

The warranty deed bears two recording

It was first recorded July 8, 1985, at which time

the relevant legal description read as follows:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to
Warren Canal thence Southeasterly along said canal
to a point 15° East 10.18 chains from County Road;
thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74°
West 198 feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis
added)•
This warranty deed was subsequently re-recorded January
21, 1987, at which time the relevant legal description was
modified to read as follows:
A part of the Northeast quarter of Section 10,
Township 6 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8 chains West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 10; running
thence West 1.06 chains; thence South 27° West to
Canal; thence Southeasterly along said Canal to a
point 15° 10.18 chains from County Road; thence
North 15° East 975 feet; thence North 74° West 198
feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis added).
It is clear from an examination of plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1
(including the Warranty
Maude

E.

Wheeler

to

Deed

Victor

from Russell C. Wheeler and
J.

Wheeler)

and plaintiffs1

Exhibit 6 that Mahas1 predecessor in title acquired only that
property North of the canal.

It is suggested that had there

been more than one canal in the area the parties would have
15

so specified.
Canal.

In reality there was but one canal, the Warren

Therefore, regardless of the status of defendant

Rindlisbacher's legal description, Mahas' predecessors cannot
convey to Mahases an interest in property South of the canal.
To do so, Mahas' predecessor in interest would be conveying
something they did not have.
CONCLUSION
The

most

critical

consideration

in

determining

boundaries is to effect the intent of the parties.

The rules

of construction for determining the intent of the parties
provides a logical sequence within which a description can be
analyzed.
First, if all parts of the description can be reasonably
interpreted to be consistent, the description should be so
interpreted.

It has been demonstrated

that there

is no

inconsistency.
Second,

if

portions

of

the

descriptions

are

inconsistent, then the order of precedence between the calls
is first to monuments and "last to courses and distances.
clarification

of Mahas'

and Rindlisbacher's

For

descriptions,

this necessitates resort to the physically existing monument
(canal).
Third,
absurdity.

a call may be disregarded

if it leads to an

The only call leading to an absurdity is a call

in the Mahas' description which doubles back upon itself.
Fourth, an inconsistent call should be disregarded if
16

thereby all the rest of the calls are reconciled and the
description perfected.

To disregard the physically existing

monument for courses and distances and an artificial monument
created on a plat is clearly contrary to law.

Furthermore,

it

all

does

not

allow

for

the

perfection

of

of

the

descriptions in that it expands plaintiffs ownership across a
physical

monument

inconsistent

with

the

ability

of

plaintiffs1 predecessors in title to convey.
The judgment entered by the lower court is inconsistent
with a correct application of the law, and that judgment
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
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I. GORDON HUGGINS,1569

Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 392-7587
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE G. MAHAS AND
LUCILLE H. MAHAS

)

Plaintiff

)

vs
LAVAR RINDLISBACHER

J U D G M E N T

)
Civil No.98505

Defendant

)

The above entitled matter having come on regularly
for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 1988, and plaintiff
appearing and being represented by their attorney, I. GORDON
HUGGINS, and the defendant appearing and represented by his
counsel, MARTIN V. GRAVIS.

Plaintiff

and

his

witnesses

having been duly sworn and testifying and the defendant
having called his witness and testified and based upon the
testimony and exhibits submitted by the parties, and the
Court having entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of law, now enters its Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

That

plaintiff is the owner of certain real property located in
Slaterville,

Weber

County,

Utah

and

more

particularly

described as follows, to wit:
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10 T6N,
R2W, SLM, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8
chains West of the Northeast corner of said Section
10; running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South
27° West to Canal; thence Southeasterly along said

canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from
County Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence
North 74° West 198 feet to the point of beginning,
free and clear of any claim of defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Warren Canal is not the canal referred to in Plaintiff and
Defendant's

property

descriptions

and

that

the

property

lines are those designated by courses and distances without
reference to any monument now in existence relating to the
South line of Plaintiff's property and the North line of
Defendants property.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
plaintiff's

complaint

against

defendant

for

that

damages

be

dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that

plaintiff shall be awarded his court costs incurred in this
matter.
DATED This

'}

day of ) ^ i > ^ > ^

/<:/ A

•/ S

, 1988

£ , /C* //

DAVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I. GORDON HUGGINS,1569
Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bldg.
Og&en, \3tah,ft4 401
Telephone: 392-7587
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE G. MAHAS AND
LUCILLE H. MAHAS

)

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND

Plaintiff

)

vs
LAVAR RINDLISBACHER

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)
)

Defendant

Civil No.98505

The above entitled matter having come on regularly
for hearing on the 23rd day of February, 1988, and plaintiff
appearing and being represented by their attorney, I. GORDON
HUGGINS, and the defendant appearing and represented by his
counsel, MARTIN V. GRAVIS.

Plaintiff

and

his

witnesses

having been duly sworn and testifying and the defendant
having called his witness who testified and based upon the
testimony

and

exhibits

submitted

by

the

parties,

Now

therefore, the Court hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the plaintiff is the owner of certain real

property located in Slaterville, Weber County, Utah and more
particularly described as follows, to wit:
A part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10 T6N,
R2W, SLM, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 8
chains West of the Northeast corner of said Section
10; running thence West 1.06 chains; thence South
27° West to Canal; thence Southeasterly along said

canal to a point North 15° East 10.18 chains from
County Road; thence North 15° East 975 feet; thence
North 74° West 198 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

That the defendant is the owner of certain real

property adjacent to Plaintiff's property, more particularly
described as follows, to wit:
A Part of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10,
T6N, R2W, SLM. U.S. Survey: Beginning 9.06 chains
West and South 27° West 22.43 chains from the
Northeast corner of Section 10 (at a point in the
Northerly line of the County road); thence North
27° East 12.00 chains, more or less, to a canal;
Thence Southeasterly along canal to a point North
15° East 10.18 chains from the County road; thence
South 15° West 10.18 chains to the County Road;
Thence Northwesterly along the County Road, 600
feet, more or less, to the place of beginning.
Excepting therefrom that portion deeded to Marvin L.
Barney and Wife, Edith E. Barney in Book 1037, page
2 and Book 1022 page 70 of Records
3.

That

conveyances

from

Plaintiff's

and

Defendant's predecessors in title describe said properties
by courses and distances

which, when surveyed and platted,

close and harmonize.
4.

That if the Warren Canal is the Canal that is

referred to in most of the Deeds, then the descriptions of
Plaintiff's and Defendant's parcels doesn't make any sense.
5.

From the evidence admitted, it appears that the

Warren Canal has not moved significantly since 1908.
6.
history,

That there is no strong evidence, in recent
that

there

is

another

canal

in

the

area

in

existence, but there is, in fact, a reference to a canal
that is described in the metes and bounds description in

that location, some evidence of a possibility that at one
time there was a canal in that area.
7.

That if this was the case where the canal was

some 50 feet or less off the metes and bounds description,
it would be assumed that that the canal was the boundary.
But, where it is some 400 feet off, to find that the Warren
Canal is the boundary would lead us to an absurd result.
8.

That there are clear descriptions of all parcels

in that area where Plaintiff's and defendant's properties
are located and they all seem to suggest that the natural
boundary is where Plaintiff is arguing it is.

It is so

found that that is the boundary.
9.

That if the metes and bounds description of

Plaintifffs property is charted with the acreage computed
therefrom, the acreage is approximately 4 1/2 acres.

If the

Warren Canal were the boundary, with the acreage computed,
there would be less than 2 acres.
absurdity.

This would result in an

Therefore, Plaintiff prevails on his claim as to

where the boundary is.
10.

That

there

is

insufficient

evidence

to

determine damages claimed by plaintiff for defendant's use
of the property or otherwise.
From

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact, the

Court

enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment against

defendant determining that the true property line between

the properties of the parties be located by the Courses and
distances calls only of their respective conveyances.
2.

That

the Warren

Canal

is not

the monument

referred to in the conveyances of Plaintiff and Defendant,
3.
dismissing

That

defendant

Plaintifffs

is

entitled

Complaint

against

to

an

Order

defendant

for

damages to plaintiff!s property.
4.

That Plaintiff

is entitled to his costs of

Court.
DATED This

//

day of

/si

Vr^ cT^y^\

O^ t / / X £

DAVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM
MARTIN V. GRAVIS

Attorney for Defendant

f

i 9 8 8.
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I. GORDON HUGGINS,1569

Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 392-7587
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE G. MAHAS AND

)

LUCILLE H. MAHAS

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
Plaintiff

)

LAVAR RINDLISBACHER

FOR A NEW TRIAL and
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES

Defendant

)
)

Civil No.98505

The above entitled matter having come on regularly
for hearing on the 15th day of August, 1988, plaintiff
represented

by

their

defendant

represented

Arguments

were

made

counsel,
by
to

I.

GORDON

his

counsel, GARY

the

Court

and

HUGGINS
A.

based

and

SARGENT.
upon

the

arguments of counsel and notations made at the time of the
trial, the Court makes the following findings:
1.

A great reliance was placed upon the testimony

of the three expert witnesses testifying at the time of
trial, all of whom testified that the properties of both
plaintiff and defendant would not close if the Warren Canal
were used as a reference point to determine the boundary of
the parties properties.

In their opinion the Warran Canal

was not the canal referred to in the Deeds to Plaintiffs1
and Defendants1 properties, and the court so finds..

2.
between

That the difference of 400 feet in the distance

the

Warren

Canal

and

the

metes

and

description is to great a difference to ignore.

bounds

The Warren

Canal cannot be used as the call in determining the boundary
lines of plaintiffs1 and defendants1 properties,
3.

That the decision heretofore made in the above

entitled matter was correct and is reaffirmed.
4.

That plaintiffs Motion for Attorney fees is not

appropriate in this matter, and that defendant's Motion for
a New Trial should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the court makes the following order:
1.

That defendant's Motion

for

New

Trial

is

2.

That plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees is

3.

That the decision heretofore made in the above

denied.

denied.

entitled matter is hereby reaffirmed in its entirety.
DATED this 1P^

day of August, 1988.

DA-VIE
>AVID E. ROTH

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM

GARY A/SARGEN

